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An alternative to the direct payments modulation under CAP Regulation n. 2237/2003 is 
presented, using a logistic function model where payments to farmers are related to 
economic efficiency, environmental impact of agricultural production, and farmer’s 
income. 
The approach used develops into two phases: in phase one the focus is on modulation 
among countries; then in phase two redistribution among farmers within a Member 
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1. Introduction 
  
The most recent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European 
Union (EU), known as the Mid Term Review (MTR) of Agenda 2000, was approved by 
the Council of Ministers of Agriculture in June 2003 and started to be adopted by 
member states in January 2005. It is thus too soon to even try an evaluation of its 
results. However some prospective effects of its effects of its implementation are 
possible and were performed.
1 
The MTR is the last step of a long process, beginning with the MacSharry reform in 
1992, along which the concepts of decoupling farmer’s income support via direct 
payments, and agro-environmental and social accompanying measures were 
progressively introduced and implemented. In the entire process there was a clear 
willingness to shift resources from the so called ''first pillar'' to the ''second pillar'' of 
CAP, e.g. reinforcing rural development and environmental friendly practices at the 
expense of traditional market support measures.  
One of the key instruments to achieve such goals was the introduction of modulation of 
direct payments (DP) to farmers. 
Initially introduced as a voluntary scheme by Regulation n. 1259/1999, also known as 
''Horizontal Regulation'', modulation became compulsory after a long series of 
proposals and negotiations that ended up with the approval of Regulation n. 2237/2003, 
in the framework of the MTR. In its final version modulation was designed as a very 
simple, even simplistic, scheme were farmers get as direct payments the amount of 
support they received historically, where historically means the 2000-2002 average of 
the amounts received. Additionally farmers whose historic support exceeds 5,000 euros 
will suffer cuts in their payments from 3% in 2005 up to 5% in 2007, and remaining at 
this last level thereafter. According to the Regulation the amount of resources equal to 1 
percent point of modulation rate will be kept by the Member State while the remaining 
will be redistributed to Member States following ''objective criteria'' defined by the 
Commission.
2 
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2 The criteria are: the share of agricultural employment (35%), the share of Utilised Agricultural Area 
(65%) and the per capita GDP (as a correction factor).   2
The aim of this paper is to point out what we consider the main limitations of this kind 
of modulation and to propose an alternative scheme. 
In the next section those limitations are put forward and the desirable features of an 
alternative scheme are analysed. In section 3. the analytical model is presented,  section 
4. shows model results from several simulations and in section 5. a few concluding 
remarks  are put forward. 
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2. Another way to look at modulation 
 
As it was designed modulation suffers from several limitations, namely: 
-  it favours the freezing of the “historic” allocation of resources; 
-  does not induce specific incentives for either improving that allocation and/or adopt 
environmental friendly practices; 
-  does not take into account the sound differences that exist among Member States in 
what concerns the negative impact of agricultural production on the environment, 
nor the marked divergences in farmer’s income. 
In fact, when farmers receive as direct payments exactly the same amount they got in 
the past, they do not feel any urgent motivation to change their product mix and 
technologies. 
In what concerns environment, it is true that Regulation n. 1259/1999, article n. 3, 
establishes that each Member State may link direct payments to the adoption of 
environmental measures retained appropriate to its specific situation. Furthermore 
Regulation n. 2237/2003 states that a farmer receiving DP can choose not to farm his 
land, in which case he is bound to respect the “good agricultural and environmental 
conditions” defined by the member State. None of these possibilities does however 
define a functional link between DP and environmental friendly practices such as, for 
instance, “better performance means higher payments”. 
As to the third type of limitations stated above it is well known that the level of the 
negative impact of agricultural production on environment in terms of, for example, 
green house gas emissions is quite different among member states due to the diversity in 
fertilizers and pesticides use. As it is also well known and documented that there are 
very sound divergences in farmer’s income among EU Member States.
3 
It looks then desirable to define a mechanism that makes DP work as an instrument of 
income support, but with compliance of environment standards and economic 
principles. 
For that purpose a few simple guidelines seem appropriate. 
First of all, the recognition of diversity in environmental impacts and income levels 
leads to shifting the focus of the analysis from modulation within countries (as it is 
                                                 
3  Buckwell, A. (1997)   4
designed now) to modulation among countries. Why should a country with highly 
intensive agricultural production, generating high levels of green house emissions and 
causing important damages in underground waters, be treated equally to another one 
where agricultural production has much lesser negative impacts on the environment? 
If income support derives its legitimacy from society being willing to pay for the 
positive externalities farmers produce and cannot be accounted for by the market, and 
from a socially recognized need for income redistribution, why should countries where 
the average farmer’s income is double the national average be awarded the same rate of 
support received by farmers in countries where their average income is half of the 
national average? The redistribution effects imbedded in the present design of DP may 
rightly be questioned.
4 
Last, but not the least, it seems difficult to accept DP to farmers independently of their 
economic performance. If no economic efficiency criteria are taken into account, then 
the allocation of resources has no support whatsoever on economic rationality. 
Although debatable all these questions are worth consider in an alternative scheme for 
DP. 
It looks then appropriate to make DP to farmers dependent on the following items:  
-  economic efficiency;  
-  level of environment damages;  
- farmer’s  income. 
The choice of quantitative variables that can best represent these items is of course 
highly dependent on data availability. But the desired behaviour of those variables can 
be anticipated. 
It is not difficult to accept that the rate of support awarded must be growing with 
economic efficiency; declining with environment damages; and also declining with 
farmer’s income, if redistributive effects are to be achieved. The rate of increasing or 
decreasing support can be assumed as constant, show either increasing or decreasing 
returns, or even both types of returns. 
The last of these alternatives seems better suited to model the relationship between DP 
and the chosen variables. Simply decreasing or increasing rates of support would lead 
to extremely high benefits or costs to the extreme cases. For instance very high levels 
                                                 
4 See again Henke, R. and R. Sardone (2003).   5
of income would be abnormally penalised with a constant decreasing rate of support. 
By the same token, with constant increasing support, low economic efficiency would 
determine drastic cuts for less efficient farmers which could prevent any kind of 
potential improvement. 
Thus being a relationship that starts by increasing at an increasing rate and then 
becomes increasing at a decreasing rate seems appropriate to link economic efficiency 
and the rate of DP. On the other hand a relationship starting by decreasing at an 
increasing rate and then shifting to decreasing at a decreasing rate, can better link DP 
and environment damage. This type of relationship can be described by a well known 
functional form: the logistic function 







As can be seen in Section A of the Appendix, the logistic curve fulfils the above 
mentioned requirements. In addition one can build a combination of two or more 
logistic curves, as it is also shown in Section A of the Appendix, and make the rate of 
DP dependent on more than one variable. 
The logistic has yet other interesting properties. The parameter  γ   is the upper 
asymptote of the function, while the horizontal axe is the lower asymptote. This means 
that γ  is the maximum value the function can reach. It is also easy to see that the 




How can we then use the logistic function to model the relationship between DP and 
economic and environmental variables? 
First of all let us define the variables not in absolute terms but in terms of deviations 
from a given norm value. The norm can be any simple statistical indicator like the 
mean or the median values of the variables, or can be set by the policy decision makers 
as the normal value. This means that, for example, the income variable is measured as 
the deviation of the (average) farmer’s income in each Member State from the average 
of the EU-15 Member States. 
Secondly, direct payments are taken as percentages of the fixed DP. The fixed DP being 
defined by policy makers, as it was the case when Regulation n. 2237/2003 adopted the   6
historic values of support received by each Member State as the basis for modulation. 
This means that the dependent variable of the model is the percentage of the fixed DP 
that each country should receive.
5 
Since variables are defined as deviations from the norm, and given the fact that the 




,  this intercept is the value of the 
dependent variable at the norm values of the explaining variable(s). Then, making the 
intercept equal to 1 (or 100%) means that, at the norm value(s) of the independent 
variable(s) the DP to be paid equals the fixed direct payment. From this it follows that  





     ⇒       β γ + =1  
This is the main constraint of the model that will be presented in the next section. 
And what about other guidelines for defining the values of the parameters,  
γ , β  and α . 
Recalling that  γ   is the upper asymptote of the function, it follows that γ  is the 
maximum percentage value the decision makers are willing to accept for DP. In other 
words, making γ  = 1.25 means that direct payments can never exceed 125 percent of 
the fixed value. And the value of γ  automatically determines β . 
The parameter α  determines the rate at which the function increases or decreases. 
Higher values of   α  correspond to faster rates (steeper curves) and lower values to 
slower ones. The parameter can then be changed to accommodate the rate decision 
makers see as more appropriate, or seen in another perspective, how sensitive DP 
should be to variations in the explaining variables. 
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3. The model 
 
The model is formulated as 
z y x s s s e e e
DPR
3 2 1 1 1 1
3 2 1













 with    1 γ  ,   2 γ  ,   3 γ ,   β  ,   1 α  > 0    and     2 α  ,  3 α  < 0 
            β γ γ γ + = + + 1 3 2 1  
 and where 
            DPR = direct payment rate as percentage of the fixed DP 
             x s  = economic efficiency indicator deviations, defined as 
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* x being the  norm value of the economic efficiency indicator 
        
             y s  = green house gas emissions indicator deviations, defined as 







                   
* y  being the  norm value of the green house gas emissions 
                           indicator 
 
              z s = farmer’s income indicator deviations defined as 







                  
* z being the norm value of the farmer’s income indicator 
 
Within this framework we can get the amount of DP that should be assigned to each 
country as a function of its positioning relatively to the norm values. Some will get 
more than the fixed value and some will get less. Once these values are obtained a 
similar model can be used, to assign the DP within each country as a function of   8
farmer’s economic dimension if the Member State considers that an important element 
of the redistribution policy. 
 
To implement the model it is then necessary to: 
(i)  choose the parameters values; 
(ii) define  the  norm values for the variables; 
(iii) establish  the  fixed DP. 
For the tentative application whose results are presented in the next section we assumed 
that it would not be realistic to think that CAP decision makers would accept that either 
a member State or a farmer could ever receive more than 133 percent of the fixed DP.  
The values of   1 γ  ,   2 γ   and   3 γ   have then to add up to 4/3 and β  results equal to 1/3. 
As to α , several values were tried when performing different simulations. Two 
alternative  norm values were used in the experiment: the arithmetic mean and the 
median of the values observed for each country and indictor. 
The direct payment was fixed for each country at the historical level according to 
Regulation n. 2237/2003. 
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4. Model results 
 
Two sets of simulations were performed. In one the three variables model was used and 
in the other only two variables was used: economic efficiency and economic dimension; 
economic efficiency and GHG emissions; economic efficiency and farmer’s income. 
Two alternative measures were computed for the economic efficiency indicator: Total 
Standard Gross Margin/ Agricultural Area and Total Standard Gross Margin/ 
Agricultural Work Unit.  
The GHG emissions were measured in tonnes of CO2 per Economic Size Unit (ESU), 
for each country. The CO2 level of emissions was the 1995-97 average as reported by 
the OECD.
6 
Farmer’s income was taken from the Eurostat Database NewCronos and for each 
country the farmer’s income indicator was computed as the ratio Total Farmer’s 
Income/ Number of Farms. 
Table 4.1 shows the complete description of the simulations performed. Simulations 
number 7 and 8 were performed with an alternative measure of farmer’s income 
(entrepreneurial income) and since they gave very similar results to those of simulations 
5 and 6 they are not presented here.
7 
As stated above different values of  α  were tried to get simulation results that could be 
compared with the direct payments scheme resulting from Regulation n. 2237/2003. In 
this context, by comparable we mean not radically different in terms of total volume of 
funds involved, otherwise they would not be at least potentially acceptable for decision 
makers. For the two variables version of the model  we finally adopted α 1 = 0.3      and  
α 2 = -0.6. For the three variables version  α  1 = 0.3,   α 2 = -0.3  and  α 3 = -0.55. 
The results of the exercise performed are showing in Tables 4.2. 
The first impression one gets at looking at table is that results represent a fairly wide 
range of possibilities that look quite acceptable. The highest cut in DP takes place for 
Netherlands under simulation 2.2 and equals 20 percent of the fixed DP. On the other 
extreme the highest increase in DP refers also to the Netherlands under simulation 4.1 
and points towards a 6 percent increase in DP. The 20 percent cut is a consequence of 
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7 The complete set of results is available from the author upon request at fbsoares@fe.unl.pt 
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the very large economic dimension of Dutch farms, while the 6 percent cut derives from 
the high green gas emissions originated by Dutch agricultural production. 
Going into a more careful analysis of Table 4.2 it becomes apparent that countries with 
highly intensive agricultural production, higher economic dimension of farms and 
higher farm incomes tend to be penalised, as it is the case of Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. On the other hand 
countries with lower farming intensity, small farm size and income, like Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Austria and Portugal and tend to be beneficiaries. Germany, Spain, 
Finland and Sweden remain more or less unaffected by this alternative scheme of 
computing direct payments to farmers. 
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Table 4.1 – Variables included in the simulations 
Norm value of the indicator set as the:  Simulation 
number  Arithmetic mean  Median 
1.1  EEA ; ED   
1.2    EEA ; ED 
2.1  EEW ; ED   
2.2    EEW ; ED 
3.1  EEA ; GHG   
3.2    EEA ; GHG 
4.1  EEW ; GHG   
4.2    EEW ; GHG 
5.1  EEA ; FI   
5.2    EEA ; FI 
6.1  EEW ; FI   
6.2    EEW ; FI 
9.1  EEA ; GHG ; FI   
9.2    EEA ; GHG ; FI 
10.1  EEW ; GHG ; FI   
10.2    EEW ; GHG ; FI 
 
                 Legend: 
                 EEA = Economic Efficiency measured as  
                             Total Standard Gross Margin / Agricultural Area 
                 ED = Economic Dimension 
                 EEW = Economic Efficiency measured as 
                           Total Standard Gross Margin / Agricultural Work Unit 
               GHG = Green House Gas Emissions 
                FI = Farmer’s Income 
 
If we look further at the last four columns of the table, corresponding to simulations 
where the three variables – economic efficiency, green gas emissions and farmer’s 
income – were present, the picture remains basically the same.  
Table 4.2 – Values of Direct Payments Rates (DPR) 
Simulation number 
Country 
1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 9.1 9.2  10.1 10.2
Belgium  0.98 0.97 0.98 0.95 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.01 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.95
Denmark  0.93 0.89 0.95 0.90 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.90 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.90 0.94 0.91 0.94
Germany  0.99 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01
Greece  1.06 1.07 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.00 0.99 1.03 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.04 1.01 1.02
Spain  1.02 1.02 1.03 1.02 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99
France   0.97 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.93
Ireland  1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97
Italy  1.05 1.06 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.05 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.03 1.03
Luxembourg  0.97 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.88
 Netherlands  0.92 0.87 0.87 0.80 1.10 1.13 1.06 1.05 0.87 0.95 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.91 0.83 0.87
Austria  1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.03
Portugal  1.04 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.03 1.04 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03
Finland  1.01 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.99 1.01 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01
Sweden  1.00 0.99 1.02 1.01 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.02 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01
United Kingdom  0.93 0.90 0.96 0.92 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.97
                  Source: Model results  13
A clearer cut view of the results is obtained if we compare the fixed DPs with the values 
resulting from the model. For that purpose Table 4.3 was constructed. 
Looking at the last row of the table it can be seen that simulations results vary from a 
decrease of  7.4 percent in total direct payments (simulation 10.1) to a situation in where 
total direct payments equal the historic level (simulation 2.1). There is thus a lot of 
room for decision makers choice. 
For eleven of the fifteen countries we can find results corresponding to both increasing 
and decreasing DP. The most extreme case is Netherlands that in simulation 2.2 suffers 
a reduction of 20.2 percent in its historic DP, while in simulation 3.2 it experiences an 
increase of 12.6 percent. The explanation for such a high variance in results is rather 
simple. The Netherlands is an outlier in the distributions of the variables used. Thus 
Dutch deviations from the norm tend to be high and consequently DPR deviate more 
from the status quo value of one. 
Italy and Austria end up by being always beneficiaries of higher DP, while Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom are always confronted with smaller benefits. This does not 
mean however that Luxembourg would always receive less than they are allocated with 
Regulation n. 2237/2003. For example in simulation 1.1 Luxembourg would get less 2.7 
percent in DP while under the Regulation it would see DP decline 3.7 percent. The same 
with the United Kingdom. Under simulation 3.2 the cut would be 3.0 percent while it 
reaches 4.2 percent under the Regulation. 
As pointed out at the end of section 3, after the distribution of DP among countries is 
obtained each Member State can choose to perform further modulation or adopt a 
proportional distribution of costs or benefits among its farmers. If the country is 
receiving more than foreseen by the Regulation a proportional distribution seems fair 
inasmuch as there are no costs to be supported, only benefits. But if the country receives 
less, than it may make sense to apply modulation. 
The rationale for this modulation is exactly the same as that adopted in Regulation n. 
2237/2003: the burden should be bared by larger farmers. But in this case there is a 
small (big) difference. The scope of the exercise is not to further cut total farmer’s 
payments but to redistribute the volume of funds allocated to the country. The 
appropriate variable to use for this purpose is economic dimension of farms whose 






Table 4.3 – Direct payments under Regulation n.2237/2003 and model simulations (Mio EUR) 
Regulation n. 2237/2003  Model simulations 





Value  ∆% Value  ∆% Value ∆% Value ∆% Value ∆% Value ∆% Value ∆% Value ∆% 
be  503.8  485.8 -3.6  495.6 -1.6  488.8  -3.0  495.2  -1.7  477.0  -5.3 514.6  2.1 521.3  3.5 514.3  2.1 509.5  1.1 
dk  996.9  960.0 -3.7  923.5 -7.4  891.4 -10.6  944.8  -5.2  897.5 -10.0 987.5  -0.9 992.4  -0.5 1,008.9  1.2  998.6  0.2 
de  5,380.9  5,178.5  -3.8 5,312.2  -1.3 5,260.6 -2.2 5,391.7  0.2 5,275.3 -2.0 5,391.3  0.2 5,418.5  0.7 5,470.9 1.7  5,433.2 1.0 
gr  1,936.8  1,908.0 -1.5  2,047.4  5.7  2,075.4  7.2  1,991.5 2.8  1,986.8 2.6  1,987.0 2.6  2,008.4 3.7  1,931.0 -0.3 1,919.8 -0.9 
es   4,809.1  4,662.1 -3.1  4,907.1  2.0  4,913.8  2.2  4,932.6 2.6  4,908.0 2.1  4,772.2  -0.8  4,771.6 -0.8 4,797.7 -0.2 4,765.8 -0.9 
fr  8,354.4  8,024.6  -3.9 8,139.0  -2.6 8,018.4 -4.0 8,286.8 -0.8 8,080.8 -3.3 8,298.9 -0.7 8,320.3 -0.4 8,446.7  1.1 8,382.7  0.3 
ie  1,255.7  1,218.1 -3.0  1,265.6  0.8  1,262.6  0.5  1,271.2 1.2  1,257.9 0.2  1,159.5  -7.7  1,145.2 -8.8 1,165.1 -7.2 1,140.5 -9.2 
it  3,910.5  3,816.9 -2.4  4,103.9  4.9  4,150.9  6.1  4,020.9 2.8  4,006.8 2.5  4,012.0 2.6  4,053.2 3.6  3,929.0 0.5  3,909.1 0.0 
lu  29.5  28.4  -3.7  28.7  -2.7  28.3 -4.2  29.0 -1.6  28.3 -4.1 25.9  -12.0 25.4  -13.8 26.3  -10.9 25.5  -13.7 
nl  705.5  681.6 -3.4  645.7 -8.5  614.7 -12.9  613.7 -13.0  562.7  -20.2 777.5  10.2 794.6  12.6 745.5  5.7 742.6  5.3 
at  696.5  681.6 -2.1  714.3  2.5  716.8  2.9  715.7 2.8  711.8 2.2  710.1 2.0  714.3 2.6  711.5 2.2  709.3 1.8 
pt  582.0  571.0 -1.9  602.6  3.5  606.5  4.2  594.6 2.2  592.8 1.9  585.3 0.6  587.4 0.9  577.2  -0.8  573.7  -1.4 
fi  528.4  515.4 -2.5  532.7  0.8  531.7  0.6  532.4 0.8  524.8  -0.7  537.6 1.7  541.6 2.5  537.2 1.7  534.7 1.2 
se  718.0  693.1  -3.5  716.8  -0.2  712.6  -0.7  733.8 2.2  724.1 0.8 696.8  -3.0 694.7  -3.2 713.8  -0.6 706.2  -1.6 
uk  3,755.6  3,596.8  -4.2 3,500.4  -6.8 3,386.7 -9.8 3,596.9 -4.2 3,452.6 -8.1 3,651.7 -2.8 3,643.2 -3.0 3,748.2 -0.2 3,709.2 -1.2 
EU-15  34,163.6  33,021.9 -3.3 33,935.4 -0.7 33,659.0  -1.5 34,150.9  0.0 33,487.1  -2.0 34,107.8  -0.2  34,232.1 0.2  34,323.2 0.5  34,060.1  -0.3 





Table 4.3 (continued) – Direct payments under Regulation n.2237/2003 and model simulations (Mio EUR) 
Regulation n. 2237/2003  Model simulations 





Value  ∆% Value  ∆% Value  ∆% Value  ∆% Value  ∆% Value  ∆% Value  ∆% Value  ∆% 
be  503.8  485.8  -3.6 470.9  -6.5 497.1  -1.3 470.5  -6.6 485.3  -3.7 466.5  -7.4 483.7  -4.0 466.4  -7.4 477.8  -5.2 
dk  996.9  960.0  -3.7 896.5  -10.1 942.2  -5.5 917.8  -7.9 948.4  -4.9 901.0  -9.6 932.3  -6.5 911.6  -8.6 935.4  -6.2 
de  5,380.9  5,178.5 -3.8  5,285.1  -1.8  5,423.2  0.8  5,364.7 -0.3 5,437.9  1.1 5,319.8 -1.1 5,404.0  0.4 5,359.6 -0.4 5,411.4  0.6 
gr  1,936.8  1,908.0 -1.5  1,987.3  2.6  2,033.3  5.0  1,931.3 -0.3 1,944.7  0.4 1,990.8  2.8 2,015.8 4.1  1,962.8 1.3 1,971.5  1.8 
es   4,809.1  4,662.1  -3.1 4,639.5 -3.5 4,733.2 -1.6 4,665.0 -3.0 4,727.3 -1.7 4,718.9 -1.9 4,780.8 -0.6 4,731.6 -1.6 4,777.9 -0.6 
fr  8,354.4  8,024.6  -3.9 7,371.3  -11.8 7,710.1 -7.7 7,519.1  -10.0 7,772.4 -7.0 7,512.6  -10.1 7,760.2 -7.1 7,586.5 -9.2 7,791.4 -6.7 
ie  1,255.7  1,218.1  -3.0 1,210.9 -3.6 1,238.7 -1.4 1,216.5 -3.1 1,234.0 -1.7 1,207.0 -3.9 1,221.8 -2.7 1,209.8 -3.7 1,219.4 -2.9 
it  3,910.5  3,816.9 -2.4  4,042.2  3.4  4,124.0  5.5  3,959.2 1.2  3,979.9 1.8  4,055.7 3.7  4,098.4 4.8  4,014.2 2.7  4,026.3 3.0 
lu  29.5  28.4 -3.7  25.1 -14.8  26.5 -10.3  25.5  -13.7 26.5  -10.2 24.9  -15.5 25.8  -12.5 25.1  -14.9 25.8  -12.4 
nl  705.5  681.6  -3.4 615.7  -12.7 668.5  -5.2 583.7  -17.3 616.5  -12.6 604.2  -14.4 642.6  -8.9 588.2  -16.6 616.6  -12.6 
at  696.5  681.6 -2.1  701.0  0.7  712.4  2.3  702.4  0.9 707.4  1.6 711.9  2.2 718.6  3.2 712.6  2.3 716.1  2.8 
pt  582.0  571.0 -1.9  598.6  2.9  606.0  4.1  590.6  1.5 592.4  1.8 604.7  3.9 608.1  4.5 600.6  3.2 601.3  3.3 
fi  528.4  515.4  -2.5 520.9  -1.4 534.0  1.1 520.5  -1.5 527.0  -0.3 526.4  -0.4 534.6  1.2 526.2  -0.4 531.2  0.5 
se  718.0  693.1  -3.5 706.7  -1.6 720.4  0.3 723.7  0.8 731.8  1.9 710.9  -1.0 718.6  0.1 719.4  0.2 724.3  0.9 
uk  3,755.6  3,596.8  -4.2 3,488.0 -7.1 3,598.7 -4.2 3,584.6 -4.6 3,664.6 -2.4 3,528.0 -6.1 3,602.5 -4.1 3,576.3 -4.8 3,635.5 -3.2 
EU-15  34,163.6  33,021.9 -3.3 32,559.7  -4.7 33,568.0  -1.7 32,775.1  -4.1 33,396.1  -2.2 32,883.3  -3.7 33,547.8  -1.8 32,991.1  -7.4 33,461.8  -2.1 
Source: European Commission - Council Working Party, 2003 and model results  16
 
In this new context the model has to be applied in a way that the sum of the payments 
made to all size classes of economic dimension must add up to the total amount of funds 
allocated to the country.  
In analytical terms this requirement may be written, for each country receiving less than 
the historic level, as 
 
















          TDP = Total Direct Payments to the country 
           i = class size of economic dimension 
          sdi = deviation of average dimension in class  i  from average dimension of all  
                  classes 
          ESUi = economic dimension of class  i  
          DPESU = average DP (Total Direct Payment under Regulation n. 2237/2003 
                                                                                              / Total Economic Dimension) 
With given values for  γ   and   β  the equation can be solved for  α  and then the 
logistic function applied to compute DPR values for each of the  n  classes. 
This computation was performed and, just for exemplification, selected results for 
Belgium are shown in Table 4.4. 
According to Regulation n. 2237/2003 Belgium should receive 503.8 million euros as 
DP. This means that by each economic size unit Belgian farmers would receive on 
average 503,800,000 / 3,155,270 ESU = 159.67 euros/ESU. Then the 5,000 euros upper 
limit of exemption would correspond to 5,000 / 159.67 = 31.315 ESU of dimension. If 
we look at Table 4.4 we see that in our exercise cuts in direct payments take place only 
at the   40 - < 100  class and over. Thus the intention of exempting from cuts the smaller 
farmers, imbedded in the Regulation, is respected.
8 But the redistribution is made under 
assumptions of much more sound economic reasoning. 
                                                 
8 This is also true for the other simulations performed.  
 
Table 4.4 – Modulation within countries: Belgium with  γ = 4/3  and   β = 1/3 
  Direct payments per size class of economic dimension (Mio EUR)   
  0 - < 2 2 - < 4 4 - < 8 8 - < 16 16 - < 40 40 - < 100  ≥ 100  All classes
Average (00-02)  Value 1.108 2.365 6.130 13.090  56.815  212.793 211.500 503.800 
Value 1.120 2.388 6.186 13.189  56.999  211.186 204.198 495.266  Simulation 2.1 
α = -0.043707  ∆%  1.05 1.00 0.92  0.76  0.32  -0.76  -3.45  -1.69 
Value  1.117 2.384 6.175 13.169  56.961  211.520 205.743 497.068  Simulation 5.2 
α = -0.034684  ∆%  0.84 0.80 0.73  0.60  0.26  -0.60  -2.72  -1.34 
Value 1.149 2.448 6.330 13.443  57.477  206.842 182.904 470.593  Simulation 6.1 
α = -0.15881  ∆%  3.71 3.53 3.26  2.70  1.16  -2.80  -13.52  -6.59 
Value 1.132 2.414 6.247 13.297  57.200  209.385 195.616 485.292  Simulation 6.2 
α = -0.091955  ∆%  2.19 2.08 1.92  1.58  0.68  -1.60  -7.51  -3.67 
Value 1.154 2.457 6.351 13.481  57.549  206.165 179.423 466.579  Simulation 9.1 
α = -0.17638  ∆%  4.1 3.9 3.6  3.0  1.3  -3.1  -15.2  -7.4 
Value 1.141 2.432 6.290 13.373  57.343  208.081 189.176 477.836  Simulation 10.2 
α = -0.12641  ∆%  3.0 2.8 2.6  2.2  0.9  -2.2  -10.6  -5.2 
                                Source: Model results 
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5. Concluding remarks  
 
The alternative scheme that was presented is preferable to the simplistic view of 
Regulation n. 2237/2003 insofar as it takes into consideration factors like economic 
efficiency, environment impacts and farmer’s income levels. But from an applicability 
point of view it involves some difficulties. 
The variety of alternatives that can be presented to decision makers is simultaneously 
positive and negative. Positive because the room for choice is enlarged. But negative in 
the sense that the negotiation process may be more difficult. For politicians it is always 
easier to accept solutions where all countries loose or gain, than the ones that 
contemplate losers and gainers. 
From a technical perspective the proposed scheme may also present additional 
problems. While for applying the Regulation it is enough to know how much a farmer 
got in the past, to apply within country modulation it is necessary to know the economic 
dimension of each farm in terms of ESU. It is not an insurmountable job but it requires 
some computation work. 
In this proposal we did not contemplate the partial devolution of funds raised by 
modulation to the member states. This is one of the reasons why this is not a finished 
exercise. Moreover, if it was to be adopted, the scheme would require additional 
simulation work involving at least different values for the parameters of the model, to 
get a more comprehensive set of alternatives. 
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A - Logistic function shapes




where pararameters  and  are 0 and the parameter  can be 0o r 0
If   0 , and for instance with   1
3 ,   1
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with 1  1, 2  1
3 ,   1



















B - Model exemplification
Taking the variables in terms of their deviations to the norm the model can be














3 e−−30  1.0 DPR equals to the fixed
value







3 e−−30.25  1.009 DP ≈ 101% of the fixed
value







3 e−−30.5  .99762 DP ≈ 98% of the fixed
value







3 e−−3−0.25  .961 DP ≈ 96% of the fixed
value







3 e−−3−0.5  .8965 DP ≈ 90% of the fixed
value







3 e−−3−0.5  1.1742 DP ≈ 117% of the fixed
value








3 e−−30.5  .71994 DP ≈ 72% of the fixed
value